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In 1990 the Federal Government included a Most Favored Customer (MFC) clause in the
contract (OBRA 90) which would govern the prices paid to firms for pharmaceutical products
supplied to Medicaid recipients. The firms had to give Medicaid their “best” (lowest) price in some
cases, a percentage below average price in others. Many theoretical models have shown that an MFC
rule commits a firm to compete less aggressively in prices. We might expect prices to rise following
the implementation of the MFC rule, yet the work done to date on OBRA 90 has found this result
somewhat difficult to show empirically. I also conclude that the effects of the law are small and
relatively weak; however, the results are strongest where the product’s characteristics match the
incentives in the law. I find that after the MFC rule was implemented the average price of branded
products facing generic competition rose - the median presentation’s price rose about 4Y0. Brands
protected by patents did not significantly increase price. Generics in concentrated markets should
display a strategic response to the brand’s adoption of the MFC. I find support for the strategic
effect; generic firms raise their prices more as their markets become more concentrated. I find little
change in hospital prices. The results suggest that the MFC rule resulted in higher prices to some
non-Medicaid consumers of pharmaceuticals.
Fiona Scott Morton





The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90) included a rebate program
that featured a Most-Favored-Customer (MFC) clause for Medicaid reimbursement: Medicaid
would pay manufacturers the lowest price offered to any buyer of the product. The rules also
provided for Medicaid to purchase at a given percentage below average price if the best price
was not low enough. This paper examines the (perhaps-unforeseen) effects of the policy on
average pharmaceutical prices. In particular, I examine how the Medicaid Rebate rules changed
prices charged by firms in different competitive positions.
Most Favored Customer clauses have been studied extensively in the Industrial
Organization theoretical literature; see, for example, papers by Cooper (1986 and 1991), Png
(1987 and 1991), and Salop (1986). The basic model of MFC clauses has the following features,
A firm announces and commits to offering the following scheme: the lowest price it offers to any
customer within a specific time period will be the price charged to the group of customers
“covered” by the MFC. 1 This scheme has two main effects; the MFC will alter optimal price
dispersion for any one firm, and secondly, the firm will find that competing with other firms for
low-valuation consumers on the basis of price becomes more costly. Any price discount given
to a marginal customer to induce a sale must be applied to all customers covered by the MFC.
Theory tells us that firms that credibly adopt the MFC clause can commit to “soft” price
competition. Although the literature contains many models explaining the strategic effect of
MFC clauses, there has been relatively little empirical verification of the effectiveness of the
policy.z
Although OBRA 90 is the sort of experiment that lends itself to analysis, there has been
little formal work on the effects of the rebate rules. This is partially due to the difficulty of
finding appropriate data and partially to the complexity of the problem. The law applied to
actual prices paid per unit, not the more commonly available invoice prices (that do not include
cash discounts), The MFC rules varied by retail channel, which themselves had different ex ante
price distributions. To perform a good experiment, prices should be adjusted for long term
lThe firm chooses the applicable time period; it could extend the guarantee to past, future, or both
sets of customers.
2 Crocker and Lyon (1994) study the use of MFN clauses in natural gas contracts. They conclude
that the main use of the facilitating practice in that industry is to allow efficient adjustment of prices in
long term contracts.contracts, and available before and after the law change from multiple retail channels. The rebate
rule has subsections that differ in their expected effects on market outcomes. Therefore, prices
respond to multiple forces and will not necessarily move strongly in one direction, which makes
the impact of the law difficult to detect. In fact, the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) has examined the effects of the OBRA legislation on drug prices twice: once on prices
paid by the Veterans Administration (VA) and Department of Defense (DOD) and once for prices
paid by hospitals and HMOS.3 In both cases the report concluded that the GAO could not
determine “the extent to which price increases were attributable to OBRA. ” The GAO states that
VA and DOD could not provide enough data to examine the question carefully. More recently,
the CBO published a report examining discounts received by pharmaceutical purchasers in the
wake of the rebate law.4 That report notes that the prevalence of large discounts fell in 1991
and 1992 and attributes the drop to the Medicaid rebate legislation. However, the report does
not have data from before the law took effect, so before and after comparisons are not possible.
The inability to pin down a causal link between the legislation and pharmaceutical prices is
frustrating in light of the economic importance of the regulations, the clear theoretical predictions
of the ~C portion of the rebate rules, and the anecdotal evidence from market participants.5
3“Changes in Drug Prices Paid by VA and DOD Since Enactment of Rebate Provisions” GAO/HRD-
91-139 and “Changes in Drug Prices Paid by HMOS and Hospitals Since Enactment of Rebate Provisions”
GAo/HRD-93-43.
4 Congressional Budget Office, (1996) “How the Medicaid Rebate on Prescription Drugs Affects
Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” CBO, Washington, D.C..
5“Congress recently passed a law requiring drug companies to give Medicaid the same deep discounts
they give other big customers. But instead of reducing Medicaid drug prices, many companies are now
raising the prices that those other big customers must pay.”
“Now drug companies are increasing prices to some of those other buyers, including the Department of
Veterans Affairs, prepaid health plans like the giant Kaiser Permanence group, hospitals, family planning
clinics and community health centers for migrant workers, homeless people and the indigent. Health care
experts say these added costs may soon trickle down to consumers in the form of higher medical costs,
and ultimately, insurance premiums.”
“Supporters of the 1990 legislation are furious about the drug companies’ move. The chief sponsor,
Senator David Pryor, Democrat of Arkansas, chairman of the Special Committee on Aging, said the price
increases appeared to be “an attempt to circumvent the new Medicaid law,” shift costs and nullify the
savings envisioned by Congress.””
“... But a lobbyist for the drug industry, who would speak only on the condition of anonymity, said: “We
are surprised that Senator Pryor is surprised. I don’t know what else he would have expected. It’s logical
4“But instead of reducing Medicaid drug prices, many companies are now raising
the prices that those other big customers must pay. ,..it’s logical that companies
would re-examine their prices if Congress passes a law saying that Medicaid,
which accounts for about 10 percent of our revenues, must get the best price given
to any pharmaceutical customer in the country. ”
The New York Times, February 18, 1991 (remainder of quotation below)
I do not have all the information required to determine the effects of the law, but I have
enough to make some progress in our understanding of its impact. My data surround the time
the new rules took effect, so I can examine prices before and after the policy change. The theory
section explains that the market share of Medicaid, the size of a drug’s package, and the
competitive structure of the market all affect the way a drug price should respond to the
legislation. I then demonstrate that these variables predict price changes around the time the
legislation took effect in a manner consistent with the Medicaid rebate rules, Therefore, it is
likely that the rules did affect the prices of some pharmaceuticals in the US market.
I find that after the Medicaid rebate rules took effect the average price of the median
presentation of a brand facing generic competition increased by about 4%. The average price of
a patented drug did not respond to the legislation. This suggests that the MFC clause encouraged
some branded producers to engage in softer price competition, I also find evidence that the MFC
indirectly affected generic producers; generic prices rose more in concentrated markets after the
legislation took effect. This suggests that generics competing against MFC-constrained branded
competitors reacted strategically to their rival’s constraint.
The estimates contained in this paper may not be representative of all industry outcomes
for several reasons. The data I have do not include prices to HMOS (or pharmaceutical benefit
that companies would re-examine their prices if Congress passes a law saying that Medicaid, which
accounts for about 10 percent of our revenues, must get the best price given to any pharmaceutical
customer in the country.“’’LeslieRose, chief lobbyist for the Group Health Association of America, which
represents the organizations, said: “The reports we hear from H.M.0,’s across the country are really
disturbing. They are being told by drug companies that the days of discounts are over, that drug prices
will be raised. Clearly, this is an unintended effect of the new law.”
“Jose E. Carnacho, executive director of the Texas Association of Community Health Centers, said that
within weeks of passage of the Medicaid law 7 to 10 drug companies began trying to renegotiate the
discount-price contracts for his organization, which buys drugs for 31 clinics serving 250,000 patients a
year.”
The New York Times, February 18, 1991managers like Medco), the types of institutions likely have the pre-OBRA binding low price; it
is probable that the price charged these types of customers rose more than I estimate here. All
the adjustment did not occur in the time period I analyze due to the presence of long term
contracts in the market. The CBO finds that discounts are still declining in 1992. Also, the data
have a great deal of measurement error due to the prevalence of cash rebates that are not
included in recorded prices, so the results are not as precise as one might expect from a large
dataset.
Although the Federal and state governments saved 150 million dollars per quarter in
Medicaid expenditure by the end of the first year of the program (and $1.8 billion in 1994), to
the extent that some market prices rose as a consequence of the reimbursement policy, not as
much savings occurred as might have been expected. In addition, other government expenditure,
such as purchases made by the V.A,, increased due to these rising prices and partially offset the
initial gain. Finally, some non-Medicaid consumers of pharmaceuticals that had been receiving
substantial discounts paid higher prices.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The exact rules of the rebate scheme are
explained in Section I. Section II discusses the theory behind the rebate rules, The
pharmaceutical industry, its rules of entry, and the available data are discussed in Section III.
The estimation of the effects of the MFC rule on prices is reported in Sections IV and V.
Section VI concludes. Throughout the paper I use the term “price” to mean prices observed
before the Medicaid rebate is taken into account; prices here are always pre-rebate prices unless
explicitly described otherwise.
I. The Medicaid Rebate Rules
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of October 1990 (OBRA 90) included legislation
intended to reduce government spending on pharmaceuticals for Medicaid recipients by limiting
drug reimbursement prices. The Medicaid program was not receiving the low prices given to
other big buyers because it reimbursed individual hospitals and pharmacies rather than purchasing
in bulk. Medicaid is a large buyer whose purchases account for roughly thirteen percent of the
prescription pharmaceutical market. Pharmaceutical firms engage in a great deal of price
discrimination; the fact that Medicaid could not use its bwgaining power to secure the normal
6advantages of a large buyer in a market with significant price dispersion was part of the impetus
for the legislation.
To secure better prices for Medicaid (and reduce the federal deficit) OBRA 90 provided
for a voluntary program in which manufacturers could enroll their drugs.b The incentive for a
firm to enroll was that its drugs were then guaranteed access to all state Medicaid formularies
and reimbursement from the Federal program.7 A formulary is a list of drugs approved for use
by an institution. All states were required to have Medicaid “cover” all drugs participating in this
scheme. In return the program required drug manufacturers to pay rebates to state and federal
Medicaid programs. A rebate would represent the total dollar amount by which Medicaid had
“overpaid” a firm in that calendar quarter, compared to the new low prices that were now
required. Manufacturers of branded pharmaceuticals were required to sell to Medicaid at 87,5%
of Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) or their “best price,” whichever was lower. AMP is
simply a quantity weighted average of a firm’s wholesale prices. Thus if a firm sold one unit
of its product to a customer at 75% of AMP, it would effectively have to sell all its Medicaid
units at that price also (although the mechanism would be a rebate check). The best price could
not fall below 75% of AMP in the first year of the scheme, but the floor was scheduled to drop
to 50% the following year and zero thereafter. Additionally, if an innovator increased AMP of
its drug by more than the increase in the Urban CPI from a baseline period (September 1990),
the rebate amount owed to the government would increase by the amount the CPI change was
exceeded.
The important variations in the rule are twofold. Generic products were not subject to
quite the same scheme as branded products; instead, a generic product’s price to Medicaid was
required to be 90% of its AMP. Notice that whether a drug has patent protection or not is
irrelevant; if it is the innovator, or brand, it follows the brand rule before and after patent
expiration. Additionally, only outpatient drugs were subject to the OBRA program. Inpatient
6Nearly every firm selling pharmaceuticals in the US enrolled in the program when it started.
7 A couple of loopholes were available in 1991 that allowed states to have a de facto formulary if
some effort was expended. Only 11 states had “restrictive formularies” in 1991 according to Soumerai
et al (1993).
7drugs, given to a patient while staying in the hospital, did not fall under the new rules.a
Inpatient drugs include, but are not limited to, injectable drugs. A hospital can purchase oral
drugs (hereafter, pills) to dispense to inpatients or to sell to outpatients. The inpatient sales are
exempt from the rebate rules, whereas the outpatient sales are subject to the rebate rules. The
results for pills sold to hospitals will therefore be weaker than those for pills sold to drugstores
due to the mixture of inpatient and outpatient drugs in the hospital sample,
The rules required that the price used to calculate “best prices” and rebates be the [)rice
per unit of the drug; common units are the pill or the milliliter. Separate packaging alone would
not constitute a different product with a different “best price, ” Rather, the firm would have to
calculate the price per pill on all its packages of a given drug to find the lowest price.9
Additionally, OBRA 90 defined AMP to be the average wholesale price available to a member
of the “retail pharmaceutical trade, ” Only prices of goods sold to drug stores, not hospitals or
HMOS, counted in the calculation of AMP. However, prices from all sectors, including non-
profit, were used to calculate “best price.” 10 Thus, a firm would lose revenue on all its
Medicaid sales each time it sold its drug to anyone at a price lower than 87.5% of its AMP,
while AMP itself was constructed from pharmacy prices only. The exact amount owed by each
firm was calculated every quarter, using sales data from that quarter provided by each firm and
g My dataset consists of prices and quantities of cardiovascular drugs onIy; these drags are
disproportionately consumed by older patients who are often eligible for Medicare. Medicare covers the
cost of hospital stays and associated inpatient drugs. I divide drugs into injectable and oral to proxy for
inpatient and outpatient; although this rough division is not ideal, the government studies referenced above
use it. If all the Medicaid consumers in my dataset were Medicare-eligible also, Medicaid would not pay
for any injectable sold to hospitals. Therefore, since injectable are not affected by the legislation, are
bought less often by Medicaid, and the dataset contains relatively few injectable observations, I eliminate
injectable drugs from the study entirely.
9 See the Appendix for a numerical example.
10The problem with including all sales in the calculation of best price is that other government
agencies such as VA and DOD, as well as non-profit organizations, had been receiving substantial
discounts. The law now required those discounts to be given to all Medicaid units, The story I heard
from industry participants wm that many manufacturers eliminated the discounts in the face of the MFN
law. The following year a law was passed to exempt VA and DOD prices from the calculation of best
price.
8each state, by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 11 Notice that in the role of calculator
of rebates, the OIG acted as enforcer of the MFC agreement and monitored all firms to detect
cheating, The OIG had the ability to fine firms that violated the rules of the contract. Thus
firms in the industry in 1991 could be confident their rivals were applying the MFC properly and
no cheating was going on.
II The Effect of a Most Favored Customer Clause in a Market with Price Discrimination
To illustrate the effects of the Medicaid legislation, a very simple model follows where
a firm’s choice of optimal price is compared in regimes with and without best price or average
price provisions. I initially allow Medicaid’s quantity demanded to respond to price changes and
in a second example assume Medicaid demand is completely inelastic. The two cases will
produce somewhat different implications for the change in prices.
Elastic Medicaid Demand
The market has distinct submarkets indexed by i. A firm can charge different prices
across submarkets, but must charge the same price to all customers within the submarket
(examples of submarkets are chain pharmacies, HMOS, hospitals). I assume each submarket has
its own simple demand curve for the elastic portion of the market of the form: qj = ~ - bpj. Each
submarket sells some Medicaid units, a fraction y of quantity ~, although no one knows exactly
which units will be sold to Medicaid ahead of time. Therefore, the firm must choose one price
for the submarket. (The underlying intuition does not depend on the assumptions of linear
demand, same slope across submarkets, or constant proportion sold to Medicaid.) Without any
regulation the Medicaid and non-Medicaid segments of the market are identical:
Where profit is n and the optimal price for the iti market is pi*. When best price legislation is
11The data are highly confidential; only the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) sees the
figures.
9introduced, the profit expression changes:
n bestpr&e = Y~ O, - c)g,@j)+ (l-Y): (P}-c)9j@j)
i=l i=l
ai + bc
Pi” = pi * pj
(1 ‘~)(aj +bc) + Y(cbN + ~ai)
Pj” =
i
(1 -y)2b + y2bN
pi = pj
(2)
Where N is the total number of markets and pj is the minimum price. The new optimal pj is
higher than (q+bc)/2b because ~ is less than all other ai. When the firm maximizes the best
price profit function with respect to customer j‘s price and customer j has the minimum price,
the derivative has an additional positive term compared to the original case. The firm will earn
more profits if it can raise its minimum price.
A rule that mandates a discount to some customers based on average price will also alter
the firm’s profit function.
IIuve~e price = (1 - y)~ qi@i)@i - c,
1=1
N
+ YE 9i(F(1-a)) (F(l - a) - c)
1=1
(3)
Where p is the average price and u is the percentage discount below AMP that Medicaid gets.
This problem turns out to be very complex and a general solution is beyond the scope of the
paper. The intuition, however, is fairly straightforward. Medicaid consumers across all
submarkets are paying a percentage below average price that is almost surely not optimal in any
of the submarkets. The firm can change optimal prices slightly with only a second-order loss
from the non-Medicaid consumers. The altered prices will change average price and have a first-
order effect on the amount of profits earned from Medicaid consumers. Whether prices move
10up or down depends on whether optimal prices are below or above the Medicaid price and the
relative size and elasticity of the different submarkets. Since the OBRA legislation mandated a
price for Medicaid that was well below a quanti~-weighted average price, it is likely that a
f~m’s optimal response would be to raise price: the higher the firm sets its price to non-
Medicaid customers, the higher are its profits from Medicaid consumers.
Inelastic Medicaid Demand
The second framework assumes that Medicaid demand is perfectly inelastic, Since the
Medicaid final consumer does not pay for the drug he or she consumes, we might think that
Medicaid consumers do not respond to price changes at all. Of course, states can change aspects
of their Medicaid programs, such as eligibility rules, in response to price. However, states may
not have responded to the OBRA 90 legislation very quickly because of the speed of the bi11’s
passage, uncertainty over how the program would work, and delays in collecting data. Therefore,
I briefly explore the results of assuming Medicaid demands a fixed quantity of pharmaceuticals
and is completely unaffected by price, while the rest of the market has a normal demand curve,
If Medicaid demand is fixed (~, for example) and the firm is required to sell to the non-
Medicaid consumers due to political pressures, the optimal price without regulation is
(ai+bc+mi)/2b.12 price increases with the size of the inelastic segment, and, in particular, is
above the optimal price for non-Medicaid consumers. If an MFC is imposed in this framework,
higher prices will fall to (q+bc)/2b, but again, the low prices will rise to (ai+bc+Z~)/2b. 13
Once again the average price rule is very complex and I do not present a general solution.
After the rules take effect, Medicaid prices depend entirely on prices charged to other consumers.
A firm can reduce its 1991 price to the optimal price for non-Medicaid consumers (no inelastic
demanders in the market) which increases profits from that group, but causes the firm to receive
a very low price on its Medicaid sales. In order to get the Medicaid price higher, the firm can
12I assume political pressure requires the firm to sell to both types of customers, Charging infinity
to Medicaid and not selling to any other buyer would not last very long.
13Higher prices fall because the firm no longer sells at that price to the inelastic consumers.
Therefore, the firm prefers to price more optimally for the non-Medicaid segment and increase quantity
sold there.contemplate increasing prices to non-Medicaid consumers. The envelope theorem says it is worth
increasing prices slightly at least. The extent to which the firm is willing to raise prices further
will depend on the market share of Medicaid and the elasticity of demand of the other consumers,
These two effects, the jump down in price due to the reduction in importance of the inelastic
customers, and the increase due to the externality, have opposite signs and it is not clear a priori
which effect will dominate in any given situation.
To summarize, this basic discussion predicts that OBRA will cause brands to alter their
prices in response to several incentives. The best price legislation always gives a firm an
incentive to raise its lowest prices. The average price legislation has opposing effects. Prices
rise because Medicaid prices depend on other prices; however, when Medicaid demand is
inelastic prices can fall, again because the inelastic consumers are not as important in the demand
curve, so the optimal price is lower.
Note that either best price or average price was binding at any one time for any one
branded presentation. If a concentration’s lowest price was below 87.5% of AMP, its Medicaid
sales were subject to the best price rule; if its lowest price was above that level, they were
subject to the average price rule. A firm would have calculated the profits for each concentration
of each brand under both alternatives and chosen a price distribution that maximized profits.
After the legislation was passed each rule generated a significant share of rebate revenue; no one
rule was prefemed by all firms, Half of single-source brands gave discounts of more than 30%
and half of brands facing generic competition gave discounts of more than 50% in 1991. 1“
Generics were exempt from the best price rule, but had to sell to Medicaid at 90% of their
average price. Thus only the average price provision affected generic firms directly, and it
should have had the effects described above. A zero-profit firm facing an average price provision
would be forced to raise its prices to keep profits non-negative, To the extent that generic firms
were perfectly competitive and earning zero profits, this is another reason to expect prices to have
risen.
14CBO page 36. Health and Human Services has published a report (Sullivan (1992)) concluding that
the “best price” rule is not the dominant source of rebate revenue compared to the “average price”
provision. Their analysis, however, looks at prices after the MFC legislation had passed, when firms had
altered their price distributions. Thus we don’t know how much dispersion existed ex ante, but only that
the legislation did not completely deter fms from discounting below 12% of average price in 1991.
12The OBRA incentives may also have created strategic effects. Cooper shows in a model
with two firms but uniform prices, that even a firm that unilaterally institutes MFC pricing alters
its own best response function so that equilibrium prices for both firms are higher. Intuitive y,
the MFC causes price discounts to become more expensive, which discourages their use. Rivals
are aware of the altered incentives and that knowledge changes their own behavior. Oligopolistic
fiis that are competing for the same customers, as therapeutic substitutes do, will become less
aggressive in price competition under an MFC, giving market prices another opportunisty to rise.
The price responses of generic firms will also depend on the strategic aspect of the MFC and
how many generic firms are in the market with the competitive brand. When the brand is
constrained by an MFC, its best response function shifts and its rival(s) has an incentive to raise
its price. If the MFC firm has many generic rivals, all producing a fairly homogeneous product,
each of the rivals has much less incentive to give a soft response; there are many firms in the
market whose best response functions haven ‘t moved. Since on]y the brand has shifted its best
response function, there may be no (or very little) price rise by generic rivals. 1s On the other
hand, if there are few generic competitors, their price will shift noticeably in response to the
softer competition caused by the MFC and generic prices will rise.
The cap on price increases imposed by the OBRA rules eliminates the gain from raising
prices too fast. In particular, a firm would not want its average price to increase at faster than
the rate of inflation or it would have to subtract more than the difference off the price to
Medicaid.lb Therefore, a firm has no incentive to raise average price in order to increase the
price Medicaid pays for a drug -- once the rate of inflation has been reached. This part of the
rule is very important as it limits the responses to the incentives created by OBRA.
Types of players
Manufacturers of pharmaceuticals fall into two main categories. The first category
consists of “innovator” firms; they undertake research and development to discover new drugs
and bring them to market. Once approved by the FDA, such drugs are marketed under a
proprietary, or brand, name by the innovator. A second type of firm is a generic or im]tator firm.
15See Cooper (1986) for a theoretical treatment.
16See CBO BOX I, p,15,
13After patent expiration, any firm may submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application, or ANDA,
to the FDA.17 The generic firm must show its product is bioequivalent to the original branded
product. Once its ANDA is approved and the original patent has expired, a generic firm may
legally make and sell the product. Thus, some drugs have two categories of manufacturers, the
brand and one or more generics.
The variety of competitive conditions in the pharmaceutical industry will prove useful in
predicting which prices will be most affected by the rebate rules, I classify all brand (also called
“pioneer” or “innovator”) drugs that have patent protection as “patented brands. ”18 Note tha[
a patented brand continually faces competition from therapeutic substitutes, despite its patent
protection.19 The level of competition when a brand has lost patent protection can be
characterized by the number of generic firms also manufacturing the drug at any given time, I
refer to a brand in a market with one or more generic firms as a “competitive brand. ” The final
class includes all the generic manufacturers. This class can be further broken down into ANDA
holders and labelers; the definition of labelers will be given below.
Table I lists the expected effects on pre-rebate average price by competitive class and
retail sector at the imposition of an MFC rules. The pre-rebate mean price is exactly what my
data record; the prices in the data should respond to the imposition of the MFC and average price
clauses according to the strength and prevalence of the MFC, average price, and strategic effects.
17I identify which fms are participating, or have permission to participate, in each market with the
~A’s Approved Drug Products and Therapeutic muivalents. This publication details which ANDAs have
been granted; it reports the exact concentration, form, date of approval, and firm receiving the ANDA.
1sSometimes two firms discover a drug independently and share the patent or are both licensed to
manufacture and market a drug by the inventor. Although the market structure is a duopoly rather than
monopoly, I classify these observations with “patented brands.”
19Some brands are still monopolies but have lost patent protection; no generic has entered that
particular market. I call these drugs “off-patent brands,” but end up excluding them from the analysis due
to lack of useable observations.Table I: Expected Changes in Average Price
Due to Incentives in the MFC Rules
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Usually when industry prices and profits rise we expect to see entry by firms wanting a
share of the profits. Patented drugs are obviously protected from entry by their patent, Generic
manufacturers are, in general, not protected from entry. However, a generic entrant must receive
approval from the FDA before it can begin selling a generic drug. The approval process takes
eighteen months, on average, after the application is submitted. The firm would normally spend
several months preparing the application. Thus, the earliest an entrant (encouraged to enter by
the new profitability of the market) would normally appear would be towards the end of 1992,
well outside my sample period.
From a firm’s point of view, the most important question might be how much (and in
what direction) post-rebate revenues change.20 To find the post-rebate mean price, the
researcher must know where in the distribution the Medicaid purchases fall. If Medicaid sales
are already at the low end of the price distribution, the direct payments required by the scheme
will not lower firm revenue by very much. On the other hand, if Medicaid sales are often to
20“Is this a good bill or a bad bill? ...It also depends on who you are. If you market major producls
that had previously been denied forrnulary access and do not discount deeply, this is probably a pretty
good bill. If, on the other hand, your products are multi-source, your growth products are very expensive,
and/or you discount heavily, you have your work cut out for you.”
Medical Marketing and Media, February 1991
15small pharmacies without bargaining power, the rebate amount might be large. In general, the
direct effect of the rebate and the expected strategic effect of reduced competition and higher
prices oppose one another and their relative strengths cannot be precisely evaluated without
individual invoice data from fm and Medicaid purchase data that is collected by HCFA,
III. Data Description
The observations that make up the data for this study are fairly complex. To make the
structure clear, Table II illustrates the fields that make up each observation, The first elemen L
of an observation is the “drug,” or specific chemical entity, which may be called by i[S generic
or brand (proprietary) name. A drug can be manufactured by the NDA holder and any ANDA
holders that exist. The drug comes in one or more forms; a form is solid (e.g. tablet), liquid, or
other (e.g. patch); most drugs come in only one form and some have two forms. The drug-form
can be further divided into different concentrations, for example, 250mg or 500mg. The drug-
forms in this dataset have an average of 3.67 concentrations each. Several drugs have as many
as seven different concentrations, one has twelve, which is the maximum in the dataset. The
final choice variables for the manufacturer are the packaging and number of units. Tablets can
come in bottles of many sizes, from 2 to 1,000, or in unit dose packages which have, by
definition, one unit. Liquids can be packaged in bottles, bottles with droppers, or vials. Each
presentation is a unique combination of drug, labeler, form, concentration, number of units and
packaging. Adding information on revenue, quantity, month, and year turns a presentation into
an observation. All the observations in a presentation have the same drug, labeler, form,
concentration, number of units, and packaging data, The previous pharmaceutical literature has
largely worked with the most common (highest revenue) dosage form to avoid these complex
dimensions. I hope to be able to add more depth to the analysis with the additional information.
16II Table II: The Structure of an Observation in the Dataset
Examples
Drug atenolol methyldopa P
r
Labeler ICI MSD e
s
Form tablet oral liquid e
n
Concentration 100mg 50mg/ml t
a






Year 1990 1991 time














The data were collected by IMS America, a firm that provides detailed data about
pharmaceutical sales in the US. IMS provided the Cardiovascular subset of their Drugstore Audit
and Hospital Audit from 1989 through 1991. Cardiovascular drugs is one of the largest (in
revenue terms) classes of prescription pharmaceuticals and has experienced considerable
innovation in the post-WWII period. Therefore there are many drugs and competitive classes
represented in the dataset as well as about six billion dollars in annual revenue. The Audits are
created by monthly sampling of warehouse, chain pharmacy, and independent pharmacy invoices
for observations on the wholesale price, No sales to HMOS are included in these samples. Then
the individual invoices are combined, transformed from a sample into national-level data, and
reported as an estimate of national revenue and quantity. The individual invoice information is
never reported.
Hospital prices have more measurement error than drugstore prices because hospitals
receive more cash discounts than phmacies md, in addition, the number of observations is
17smaller. Cash discounts are cash returned to the customer after buying a certain quantity of a
drug, a particular mix of drugs, or a specific dollar amount with one wholesaler, that do not
appear on invoices. Discounts are nearly impossible to trace, quantify, and assign to a particular
product, and yet are an important component of the market. If invoice prices change and cash
discounts compensate, the data will show a change when none has occurred. However, the rebate
rules explicitly instructed firms to include cash discounts in their calculation of best and average
prices; thus the rule did not provide any incentive for firms to alter their rebate (v, invoice)
policies. However, some flexibility in assigning cash rebates will minimize observed change and
the existence of rebates adds considerably to measurement error in the data.21
IMS takes out a large fraction of all price dispersion before the data are seen by anyone,
I do observe one source of dispersion in my data: a type of quantity discounting, For example,
tablets can come in bottles of 10 or 1,000. The latter size might not be very practical for a small
pharmacy although the cost per pill is usually lower. Manufacturers also use special types of
packaging to take advantage of heterogeneous consumers. Proprietary convenience packaging
like “accudose” packs that mark a patient’s daily dose contain the same chemical entity as
simpler presentations but cost much more. IMS also reports payment sources, including
Medicaid, for some drugs in the sample.
The IMS data have two important features, The first is that what MS refers to as the
“manufacturer” is not always the actual manufacturer; instead it is the labeler, A manufacturer
may label all or part of its own output, It may also sell all or part of its output to one or more
labelers who put their own firm name on the package. The labeler, not the manufacturer, is
responsible to HCFA for the Medicaid Rebate on all its products. Thus each labeler has its own
AMP and rebate amount which could differ from other firms selling the identical product. I can
identify the true set of manufacturers allowed to make a given drug because each one must have
filed an NDA or an ANDA with the FDA. However, some manufacturers sell all their output
to labelers, in which case they will never show up as an IMS manufacturer. The manufacturer
and the labeler are synonymous for brand observations, but many generic drugs have multiple
21 Additionally, pharmaceutical companies sometimes sell products as a bundled package; they
combine a sale item with a full price item and charge one price for the two. The prices imputed by the
Office of Inspector General average away the deep discount, thus concealing a potential “best price.”
Bundling therefore also contributes to fins’ ability to conceal change.
18labelers. In this paper I focus on only one generic class, the distributors, and do not analyze the
ANDA holder category. ANDA holders have data that are unexpectedly difficult to work with,
perhaps because they have a different set of customers and different types of contracts than
generic distributors. ANDA data are significantly more problematic to analyze and are omitted
from the analysis hereafter.
I drop any drug in the IMS dataset which is not listed in the FDA Orange Book22, my
main source of information on the state of competition in the market. I also drop those
observations for which I cannot identify the competitive class due to some anomaly in the
market, those whose labeler is “Manufacturer Not Stated, ” and also those that have internally
inconsistent reported units. The remaining data are described in Table IV.
IV. The Problem of Identifying Price Changes Due to OBRA
The prices given by the data exhibit two main patterns. The first is a step-like pattern;
prices are flat for several months and then rise by a small amount, The increases typically come
at irregular intervals and vary somewhat in size, The other pattern is really a lack of pattern, a
scatter of points perhaps sloping up or down. A clear upward jump in January 1991 is not
visible to the casual observer. A simple statistic that should be illuminating is a comparison of
price growth before and after the law for drugs affected and unaffected by the legislation. The
GAO tried this and finds that HMO outpatient drug prices increased faster in the year after
OBRA was implemented than the year before, while hospital drug prices did the opposite, but
does not feel confident in attributing that difference to 0BRA.23 I perform the same exercise
with drugstore and hospital outpatient drugs and report the results in Table 111, Not only do
hospital growth rates increase more, which was not predicted, the standard deviations are very
large while the mean changes are quite small, This methodology makes it difficult to conclude
that one group had a significantly larger price increase than another.
22See Note 17. About 10 chemicals are listed in the IMS dataset and not in the Orange Book,
23ibid 1993. p2. Their methodology compmes price growth between July 1989 and July 1990 to
growth between July 1990 and January 1992.Table III. Oral Cardiov%cular Price Growth, Before and After Rebate Rules
mean log difference and Drugstore Hospital
standard deviation Ohs. Ohs.
June 89- July 90 -.019 1772 -.036 964
.290 .368
Ott 90- Sept 91 .008 1817 .012 1024
.322 .326
Another approach that should be helpful is to look at whether price changes around the
time of OBRA’S implementation are correlated with characteristics that give the firm an incentive
to raise price. The framework discussed above predicts that price changes in response to the
Medicaid Rebate Rules will depend on several characteristics of an invoice, However, my
dataset contains no invoice information; the analysis will have to use averaged values for a
presentation.
Medicaid’s market share (Medicaid Share) in 1990 of a particular drug will determine the
strength of the incentive to raise prices for any given price distribution. The effects of both the
best price and the average price rules will depend on the importance of sales to Medicaid. In
the extreme case of no Medicaid sales, the firm will have no direct reason to change its prices
(although it may respond to the incentives and choices of other firms), Unfortunately the variable
Medicaid Share is available for only about half the observations in the dataset. The values this
variable takes depend on the formulary rules in different states in 1990 and Federal Medicaid
reimbursement rules. The Federal program limited reimbursement of state Medicaid expenditures
for competitive brands to the price of available generics. A state therefore had an incentive to
restrict use of competitive brands since it would not be fully reimbursed for them.24 The mean
value of Medicaid share is lower in the competitive brand class than among generics or patented
drugs.
The best price rule gives firms an incentive to increase their lowest prices. Since the data
only report average prices, it seems as though we cannot make use of this incentive. However,
large package sizes usually have a lower unit price than small packages, whether due to lower
u See Soumerai et al for a description of state Medicaid policies and their effects,
20per unit costs or price discrimination. If the largest packages are sold at the lowest prices, large
packages will be more likely to find the “best price” provision binding. In such a case, firms wil1
want to raise the price of larger package sizes more. Smaller packages with higher unit prices
will not see as large a rise. We should see package size predicting price increases under the best
price legislation and for competitors of firms subject to the best price rule. The variable Relative
Size is defined to be a package’s own size (e.g. 100 tablets) over the largest size available for
that drug and firm (e.g. if 1000 is the largest size, Relative Size= lOO/lOOO=.1). Relative Size
varies from 0.0017 to a maximum of one. Note that package size is fixed, although the quantity
sold of different package sizes may change over time,
More price dispersion raises the probability of a brand finding the MFC binding and
therefore increasing its lowest prices. In the case of competitive brands, the level of competition
may affect the level of price dispersion. Borenstein and Rose (1992) find that competition is
positively associated with price dispersion. A greater number of generic competitors or a lower
Hetilndahl Index would therefore imply a stronger price rise on the part of the brand to avoid
the negative impact of the legislation. Similar reasoning extends to patented brand duopoly
markets .25 The variables Drugstore He~ and Hospital He~ are Herfindahl indices for the
Drugstore and Hospital markets respectively, calculated over the number of labelers (including
brands) selling a drug in December 1990, Number of ANDAs measures the number of firms
which have been approved by the FDA to manufacture the product by the end of 1990, Notice
that this is a fundamentally different measure of competition than the number of labelers listed
by IMS, on which the Hetilndahl variables are based.
To illustrate the difficulty of picking up the effects of the OBRA legislation, I regress the
log difference in drugstore price (over fifteen months) on concentration in the market, the market
share of Medicaid, and the relative size of the package. The results are reported for the three
main classes in Table IV. The results are extremely inconclusive; very little is significant, let
alone of the predicted sign. However, this regression does not control for characteristics of the
drugs which may be affecting price movements. A drug’s prices have trends due to exogenous
factors such as changing technology, changing demand, and seasonal effects, although we expect
25A duopoly market is one where each fm has its own brand name, but the two firms are selling
the identical product. (Usually because a foreign firm has licensed the product to two US firms.)
21to see presentation variation within the drug. Hence, it is very difficult to identify small changes
in prices with this method and the explained variation is very low. The problem with interpreting
Tables III and IV is that we are trying to explain any change due to the legislation and overall
trends in different drugs. The effects of the legislation will be small and are likely to be
swamped by important trends in technology and demand when aggregate changes are examined.
Exploiting the time series available for each presentation goes some way toward solving this
problem.
v. Estimation of Price Shifts at the Implementation of OBRA
In this section I estimate the magnitude and sign of any change in prices at the
implementation of OBRA 90. The dependent variable is one of two variables: Drugstore Price
or Hospital Price, for three competitive classes. Although quantity data are available, they are
extremely difficult to fit well because of the many outliers and differing buying patterns across
presentations. The results are very unstable, so I do not discuss them in the paper, but focus on
prices.
Brands
I examine the behavior of price over the two years surrounding January 1, 1991, the first
effective date of the new policy. The basic regression uses log price as the dependent variable,
The log form of the dependent variable allows shift and trend terms to be expressed in percent
changes and therefore be estimated as a constant across presentations and drugs, Since every
drug is experiencing different demand and supply conditions, it is important to allow for different
growth rates and seasonal patterns across drugs. Therefore, every presentation of every drug has
its own intercept and time trend. Additional variables accounting for quarterly movements in
price and quantity are included.zb These controls produce adjusted R2’s of over 0.8 in all
regressions.
Each of the explanato~ variables described in section IV is interacted with the Rule
Dummy, Rule Dummy is zero until the legislation takes effect and one thereafter. Each equation
also includes Rule Dummy on its own which will capture class-specific shocks to price not related
26For example, quantities sold are about 20% higher in Mar, June, Sept, and December than the other
months of the year. Prices are more likely to change in Jan, April, July, and Ott than other months.
22to any of the variables discussed above. For a branded class the equation is:
log pi =PIMedicaidShurei *RD +~2RelutiveSizei *~
+ ~3DrugstoreHe#t *RD




where the controls are presentation time trends, quarterly shifts, and presentation intercepts. I
analyze both hospital and drugstore markets separately; Pi is either drugstore price or hospital
price. The results for brands are reported in Table VH.
The competitive brand class, as expected, has the results most consistent with the theory.
The coefficients on the first three explanatory variables have the predicted sign and are
significant at conventional levels. A larger Medicaid Share increases average price, which
indicates the legislation is creating an overall incentive to increase price. The coefficient on
Relative Size shows that larger packages experience a larger average price increase, evidence that
they may be disproportionately represented among ‘best’ prices, The positive coefficient on
Number ofANDAs is consistent with the relationship found in Borenstein and Rose (1992); more
competitors increase price dispersion which in turn increases a firm’s incentive to raise its lowest
prices, increasing average price. The coefficients on Rule Dummy and Drugstore He~ are both
negative and insignificant. The regression fits well, which we can see in the adjusted R2 of 0.96.
Although the first three coefficients are positive, not all presentations are predicted to have the
same response when the law takes effect. I construct the total effect of the variables reported
in Table VII (X6) for each presentation. The median change is 4.3% while the mean change
across presentations is 4% with a standard error of .970. In total, the average price of competitive
brand pills rises after the law takes effect. This number can be contrasted to the average monthly
price increase in this class of 0.2% (although some presentation prices grow much quicker or
slower).
Competitive brand hospital price is predicted to rise less than drugstore price because
some of the hospital drugs are used for inpatients and are not subject to the regulation. The on]y
significant coefficient is that of Relative Size which is larger than the drugstore coefficient; the
others are insignificant, either because the incentives are too weak to move all hospital prices or
23because of the additional measurement error created by cash rebates, The mean presentation time
trend in the hospital regression is negative, which is consistent with hospitals negotiating low
prices for brands because of competition from generics. The combined effect of all the variables
is a just significant six percent increase on average. In sum, in the competitive brand class it
looks as if the MFC and the average price provision combined are working to increase drugstore
prices of those presentations with the strongest match to the incentives in the bill.
Patented brands face competition from therapeutic substitutes, and their competitors are
subject to the same incentives as themselves, To the extent brands compete against therapeutic
substitutes, the strategic effect of the MFC should apply to patented brand pricing, However, if
the level of price dispersion is lower due to lack of generic alternatives, then the chance that the
MFC is binding in the drugstore or hospital sector is lower, Patented brands may be more
affected by the average price provision than competitive brands. However, patented brands are
also likely to be bumping up against the inflation constraint already and therefore may have no
“room” to raise prices, regardless of the effectiveness of the MFC or average price provisions,
The results in Table VII show that the specific predictors of the increase in prices are
insignificant for patented brands, although Rule Dummy is positive and significant at the 670
level. Overall price levels may have moved up, but in the absence of correlation between prices
and the incentives in the legislation, it is unclear that OBRA had any effect on patented brands.
It is interesting to note that patented brand time trends are larger than competitive brand trends,
which is consistent with stronger price growth in the class. Again, the hospital regression yields
no significant coefficients.
Generic fitimation
Measures of market concentration are included in the generic regressions although many
researchers view generic competitors as zero-profit price-takers playing a Bertrand game. There
is a substantial literature that suggests the generic industry is not playing a Bertrand game.
Wiggins and Maness (1995), Frank and Salkever (1995), and Caves et al. (1991) all document
that generic price decreases steadily with the number of generic suppliers. Generic prices could
respond to the incentives of the average price provision if they face a downward-sloping demand
curve. The hetilndahl variables will have positive coefficients if prices increase more when
24concentration is high, for example.
The specification for generic producers contains an additional variable, Brand Medicaid
Share is the share of the Medicaid market sold by the competitive brand in 1990. Competitive
brand and generic markets are matched so that the variable is the Medicaid share of the relevant
competitive brand for each generic. The purpose of including this variable is to track when the
generic’s competitor is facing a large MFC or average price incentive due to a large amount of
Medicaid sales. Such a competitor will respond more strongly to the legislation, thereby
engendering a stronger change in the generic’s optimal price. Due to the large number of
presentations in the generic clmses, each drug-form gets its own time trend that is forced to be
equal across presentations in the drug-fom.27 The equation to be estimated for the generic class
is:
log ‘i =PI MedicaidSharei*RD +~2RelativeSizei *RD
+ P~(DrugstoreHe@t or Numkr~ANDAsJ *RD
+ ~4BrandMedicaidSharei *RD + P~RuleDummy
(5)
+ comoui + ei
The variable Medicaid Share is not included in the specification for hospital price. There is no
reason why a generic product’s hospital price should be influenced by its Medicaid share, since
the rebate amount does not depend on generic hospital prices at all, However, generic hospital
prices could be affected by the brand’s behavior in the hospital market. This depends on the





generic results are displayed in Table VIII. The two sides of the table use
of concentration in the market, either a herfindahl index or the number of
1990. A larger relative size significantly increases prices across all
specifications. In column one, the herfindahl index and the product’s Medicaid share have
positive coefficients, which is consistent with the theory, but they are only significant at the nine
and twelve percent levels, respectively. Since the average price provision has an ambiguous
27Testing this restriction on brands reveals it cannot be rejected in about half the drugs.
25effect on prices, the lack of significance of Medicaid Share could be expected. In both drugstore
regressions the coefficient on Brand Medicaid Share is significant and negative. This result is
unexpected, contrary to the incentives described above, and also very robust. More research is
needed to ascertain why a generic firm should lower prices for these presentations. The
he~lndahl results on the lefthand side of the table are weak, with size the only variable behaving
as expected.
The specifications using Number of NDAs as the measure of market concentrateion are
somewhat better. In column three, drugstore prices fall with the imposition of the law for
markets with a larger Number of ANDAs. Again, the coefficient on Relative Size is positive and
significant and that of Medicaid Share is positive but insignificant. The negative coefficient on
Brand Medicaid Share persists in both drugstore regressions. However, in the hospital sector
products facing a brand with considerable sales to Medicaid may raise prices more than others
(eleven percent significance). The hospital results are consistent with the strategic effect of the
MFC. Perhaps this is because hospitals are likely to be getting low prices from branded
manufacturers and these low prices trigger the MFC. Generic time trends are small and negative,
in contrast to the positive brand trends.
The presentations which are most likely to display the strategic effect most strongly are
those where package size and Medicaid share are high, giving the brand an incentive to raise
price, and the number of generic players is few, giving the generic an incentive to respond to
softer brand pricing. In principle one could include an interaction term of all three variables, but
the interpretation of a triple interaction term is awkward. Instead, in Table VIII 1 restrict the
sample to larger values of one of the variables, and include an interaction term composed of the
other two. The interaction terms should have positive coefficients. I also report the results of
a regression restricting the sample to markets where there are fewer than ten outstanding ANDAs.
A perfectly clean test of the strategic effect would use hospital data, because the law
provides no direct incentive to change hospital prices. However, the hospital data is confounded
with inpatient drugs, so I use drugstore data where the average price provision does affect generic
drugstore pricing. However, the average price provision creates no incentive for a generic firm
to increase prices of large presentations more than others, or to increase prices on presentations
where the brand’s Medicaid share is higher, so the use of drugstore data should not be biasing
26my results.
The results for generic drugstore prices (only) are displayed in Table
on Number of ANDAs increases in magnitude compared to the full sample
IX. The coefficient
result; the effect of
increased concentration on price is stronger when the market is less competitive to begin with.
Relative Size is again positive and significant, and somewhat larger than the coefficient in the
unrestricted sample. Brand Medicaid Share is still negative, but declines in magnitude and is
insignificant, This variable seems to have a stronger effect in more competitive markets with
more ~DAs. Medicaid Share is insignificantly different from zero in both regressions. In the
concentrated markets Rule Dummy becomes significantly positive, but Rule Dummy is also
controlling for the effects of the average price provision. The total effect of all the variables is
approximately zero on average, as in Table VIII.
The interaction results display further evidence for the existence of a strategic effect in
the generic segment of the market. All the interaction terms have positive coefficients, but the
interacted variables on their own have negative signs; the interpretation of the overal 1change in
a variable is reported in the last lines of the table, The net effect of increasing any of the three
variables of interest is to increase generic price when the law changes, although some increases
are close to zero. The most important result is that when the sample is restricted to concentrated
markets, increasing either package size or brand Medicaid share raises the generic price upon
imposition of the law. When the sample is limited and the interaction included, increasing Brand
Medicaid Share from .05 to .15 in a concentrated market raises the price change in response to
the law by six percent. Similarly, if Relative Size moves from 0.4 to 1, generic prices increase
by three percent more when the law takes effect. This suggests that generic producers in a less
competitive environment respond strategically to the actions of the brand in the market. The
more incentive the brand has to raise the price of a particular product, the more likely the generic
equivalent of that product shows a price increase also. Columns three and four of Table IX are
symmetric regressions that display similar, though somewhat weaker, results.
Other Variations
I tested the results reported above by running the same specifications on data from 1989-
1990 rather than 1990-1991. In these regressions the Rule Dummy turns to one in January, 1990.
27If the results are due to a regularity of the pharmaceutical market that I am not controlling for,
the 1990 results will be similar to the 1991 results. None of the coefficients on the Rule Dummy
variables are at all similar. Most coefficients are not significant; a few significant coefficients
appear in the regressions on hospital price. For the reasons discussed above, I consider the
hospital results in the paper to be less reliable. To check robustness, I investigate other
functional forms of the price regressions. One outlier drug affects the competitive brand and
generic results quite strongly because its Medicaid share is more than twice that of the next
highest drug. I do not have a good explanation for why its Medicaid share is so high, I drop
those observations from the sample and the results reported here.2a Otherwise, the results are
quite robust.
Merck & Co already had a MFC scheme in place for Medicaid sales in 1990.29 If
Merck is constrained by its own MFC pre-OBRA, its prices will not change in the expected
manner after OBRA. I re-estimate the regressions above without including Merck observations.
The results are almost identical to those of the whole sample. A self-imposed and self-monitored
MFC might not have been very credible to competitors, hence Merck might not have been
different.
VI. Conclusions
The results presented here do not show textbook responses to the OBRA legislation by
pharmaceutical prices in either magnitude or significance. As noted above, the rules are quite
complex, In particular, they do not imply that we should see prices rise for all presentations of
all drugs. However, if we look for responses among groups of products most strongly affected
2sThe drug nifedipine has a value for Medicaid share of .43. This is extraordinary considering that
the drug faces generic competition and the range for the rest of the competitive brand sample is Oto .18.
Additionally, the drug has two branded suppliers and only one has a high share, which is suspicious. (The
other firm has a Medicaid share of about .2.)
‘g “In 1990 the Company initiated its Equal Access to Medicines Program (EAMP) on its single
source products under which it offered its “bestprice” discount to state Medicaid programs that grant open
access to the Company’s products. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 largely reflects the
Company’s approach, subject to implementing regulations. ”
Annual Report, Merck & Co., 1991
28by the legislation, the expected responses are visible, though small. In particular, brands facing
generic competition raised some average prices after OBRA was implemented, and, crucial] y.
prices increased for those products with characteristics corresponding to incentives in the
legislation. The average drugstore price of a branded drug facing generic competition increased
by about four percent. In particular, drugstore prices rose for large package sizes, for drugs
where Medicaid was a large purchaser, and in markets with many generic competitors. Although
Federal and state governments reduced pharmaceutical expenditure, and therefore had to collect
that much less in taxes, some non-Medicaid consumers paid higher prices for some products, and
some pharmaceutical firms may have become better off. These price changes illustrate the risk
with MFC clauses: MFCS have distributional consequences that may be unanticipated.
;.
I find little evidence that brands protected by a patent responded to the MFC. None of
the characteristics corresponding to the incentives in the legislation are significant in predicting
price changes. This may be due to the inflation cap suppressing a response to the best and
average price provisions or less dispersion in ex ante prices. Hospital prices are poorly
measured; this fact combined with weaker incentives for the hospital market results in almost no
significant coefficients in the hospital regressions for either brands or generics.
Secondly, generic pharmaceutical prices responded to the price increases of the
competitive brands. The average presentation did not experience a price increase, but those in
concentrated markets, with large package sizes and high sales to Medicaid, had significant price
increases. The result that the number of generic manufacturers in the market affects generic
response to brand pricing provides empirical support for the strategic effect of the MFC
postulated by Cooper (1986) and others. Generics in markets with few competitors are the only
fm that could possibly have strictly benefitted from the legislation. Although generics had to
rebate about one and one-half percent (ten percent of fifteen percent) of their sales to Medicaid,
price increases on some presentations combined with likely quantity gain could have offset the
rebate payments for firms with the right product mix.
A remarked upon above, the estimates reported here may not apply to all segments of the
indust~. The data I have do not include prices to HMOS (or pharmaceutical benefit managers
29like Medco), the types of institutions likely have the pre-OBRA binding low price.30 The price
cap restricting overall price growth to the rate of inflation probably restrained some price
increases we might have expected under the other incentives in the law. It is therefore not
surprising to find that these data show the expected results of the MFC for only a few
competitive classes and sales channels of drugs. However, it is impotiant to note that, in
principle, an MFC’S indirect effect on competition could completely counteract the desired, direct
effect on expenditure. Because the data report average prices it is impossible to examine the
change in the distribution of prices within and across channels. Such an examination wou Id
reveal more subtle and interesting effects of the legislation and should be area of future research.
30“Federal officials and health care administrators say that for all but Medicaid patients, this year is
bringing another pile of higher drug bilIs. Congressional aides said that veterans hospitals face $150
million in higher drug expenses, up 21 percent. Kaiser Perrnanente, the country’s largest health
maintenance organization, said its drug costs would rise by $140 million, or 31 percent.”
The New York Times, May 11, 1991
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32Table IV: Changw in Drugstore Prices,
Oct. 1990- Dec. 199131
Dep Var: ln(P dec91) - ln(P oct go) Patented Competitive Generic
Brand Brand
Medicaid Share -.373 -.496 -.267
(.213) (.100) (.382)
Relative Size .008 -.026 .031
(.017) (.023) (.040)
Drugstore Herf .116 --- ---
(.038)
Number of ANDAs --- -.003 -.008
(.001) (.002)
Medicaid Share of the --- --- -.150
Competitive Brand (,198)
Adjusted R2 .052 .098 .021
Ohs. 135 133 478
31An observations in this regression is a presentation; the time series aspect of the data has been
collapsed into the dependent variable. The log difference of prices before and after the legislation are
regressed (OLS) on presentation characteristics.
33Table V. Summary Statistics
for Presentations
Total presentations: 3109 N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Annual Revenue 2955 2.27E06 1.4E07 21 3.26E08
Number of ANDAs 3088 8.22 6,77 0 28
Share of Medicaid (% rev) 1602 .137 .061 0 .431
Hospital Hetilndahl 3071 .462 ,280 .106 1
Drugstore Herfindahl 3052 .365 .270 .106 1
Duopoly Dummy Variable 3109 0.213 0.409 0 1
Relative Package Size 3109 0.396 0.387 0.0017 1
Number of Concentrations 3109 3.67 1.84 1 12
per Drug-Fore
Number of Presentations Pill Liquid Patch or Extended Release Pill
3109 Spray
Patented Brand 196 18 0 30
Competitive Brand 233 55 5 54
ANDA Holder 670 53 1 66
Generic Distributor 1341 30 79 219
Off-Patent Brand 32 22 5 0
Number of Drug-Forms: original > outpatient > outpatient and
data only medicaid share known
Patented Brand 42 37 25
Competitive Brand 51 38 13
ANDA Holder 49 38 12
Generic Distributor 46 37 13
Off-Patent Brand 30 18 3
Table continued on next page...
34Table VI. Summary Statistics Continued
















































































































35Table VII: Brand Average Price Changes
in January 199132
Competitive Brand Patented Brand
Dep. Var.: Ln Price Drugstore Hospital Drugstore Hospital
Medicaid Share*RD .4154 -.5268 -.4432 -.0130
(.1889) (.6962) (.2742) (,1417)
Relative Size*RD .0464 ,1413 -.0261 .0117
(.0194) (.0738) (.0217) (.0111)
Number of ANDAs*RD .0025 -,0041 ---
(.0010) (.0041) ‘--
Drugstore HeflRD or -.0264 -.0825 -.0402 -.0589
Hospital Her~RD (.0350) (.1225) (.0484) (,0319)
Rule Dummy -.0140 .1243 .0972 .0506
(.0242) (.0992) (.0504) (,0313)
Number of Observations 2991 2939 3246 3109
Number of Presentations 131 131 147 136
Adjusted R2 0.964 0,883 0.937 .980
Total effect of listed 0.040 0.066 .009 .001
variables: mean and se. (.009) (.034) (.012) (.006)
Monthly growth rates of -.132 to .030; -.083 to .060; -,144 to ,084; -.016 to .032;
presentations mean= .002 mean= -.009 mean=.008 mean=.003
Quarterly changes .003 -.014 .006 .010
(.007) (.026) (.009) (.005)
32@uation (4) is estimated, Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample for each column includes
all observations in the indicated competitive class. The dependent variable is the log of price in the
appropriate distribution channel. Intercepts for each presentation and presentation time trends are included
but not reported. Both brands’ drugstore prices have mostly small, positive time trend coefficients. After
-.132, the next lowest time trend is -.016 in the competitive brand drugstore regression. The competitive
brand hospital regression shows considerable variability across presentation time trends, unlike the patented
brand results.
36Table VIII: Generic Price Changes
in January 199133
Dep. Var.: Ln Price Drugstore Hospital Drugstore Hospital
Hetilndahl in Drugstore or Number of ANDAs
Hospital Market
Brand Medicaid -.2433 .3184 -,3024 .3516
Share*RD (.1053) (.1992) (.1058) (.2054)
Relative Size*RD .0430 .0525 .0394 .0527
(.01 12) (.0227) (,01 12) (.0227)
Measure of Market .0725 .0433 -.0031 .0017
Concentration*RD (.0426) (.0728) (.0011) (.0020)
Medicaid Share*RD .2191 --- .1048 ---
(.1421) (.1390)
‘RD -.0705 -.0286 ,0026 -.0388
(.0289) (.0301) (.0282) (.0340)
Number of Observations 12875 6280 12875 6280
Number of Presentations 740 472 740 472
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.944 0.969 0.949
Total effect of listed -0.017 .021 -.017 .018
variables: mean and se. (.010) (.018) (.010) (.018)
Monthly growth rates of -.005 to .025; -.004 to .019; -.005 to .024; -.004 to
drugs mean=.003 mean=.005 mean=.003 .020;
mean==005
Quarterly changes -.004 -.029 -4005 -.027
(.005) (.009) (.005) (.009)
33Equation (5) is estimated. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in each column includes
all observations in the indicated competitive class; the dependent variable is the log of price in the
appropriate distribution channel. Presentation intercepts are included in the regression but their
coefficients are not reported. Drug time trends are described but not reported,
37Table IX: Strategic Effect in Generic Price Changes
with restricted sampl~ (drugstore only)~
Dep. Var.: Number of Drugstore Relative Brand Medicaid
Drugstore Price ANDAs<10 He&.2 Size>.2 Shtie>.04
Number of ANDAs*RD -.0207 ---- --- .-.
(.0033)
Brand Med%*Relative --- 2.489 -– --
s~*RD (.4245)
Drugstore HefiBrand --- --- 8.152 ---
Med%*RD (1.427)
Drugstore HeflRelative --- --- --- ,3935
Size*RD (.1006)
Drugstore HefiRD --- .0828 -.3203 -.0404
(.0555) {.1007) (.0587)
Relative Size*RD .0624 -.0148 .1104 -.0222
(.0128) (,0256) (.0206) (.0276)
Brand Medicaid -.1725 -.6521 -1.547 -.0281
Share*RD (.1047) (.2797) (.2906) (.1672)
Medicaid Share*RD -.1882 .6904 -.0770 .4760
(. 1345) (.2963) (.2043) (.2737)
RD .0981 -.1437 -.0166 -.1077
(.0286) (.0515) (.0487) (.0587)
No. Ohs. 6057 5872 6094 6463
Adjusted R* 0.983 0.983 0.979 0.976
—
Total effect of listed -.011 -.018 -.010 -.014
variables: mean and se. (.012) (.014) (.013) (.028)
Marginal If RelSize + .6 .034 --- .-.
Effects at: If Brand Meal% + .1 .066
BrMed=.05
Drugstore If DHerf+ .1 --- .009 ---
Herf=O.2 If Brand Meal% + .1 .008
RelSz==.4 I.fDHetf+ .1 --- --- .012
If RelSize + .6 .034
MEquation (5) with an additional interaction term is estimated. Standard efiors are in parentheses.
Regressions include presentation intercepts which are not reported. The restricted samples are designed
to include approximately half of the dataset; the observations with the highest value for ANDAs, Medicaid
Share, and Relative Size, respectively, form the three samples. The exact cutoff for each variable is listed
at the head of each column.
38
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